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NOTES
The inevitable result of a deduction disallowance is that large concerns
with excess working capital have the greatest ability to purchase"0 and
business ownership therefore becomes more and more concentrated.
These consequences appear inconsistent with recent legislation.'
Ultimately, the goals of both the antitrust and tax laws should be
examined and steps taken to correlate respective policies. This may re-
quire that the entire tax structure be revamped. However, as an im-
mediate step, the tax treatment of en masse contracts, customer structure
and goodwill could be revised to aid small business and foster that free
and open competition which is the cornerstone of our economy.
EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
On October 31, 1963, the Department of Justice filed a civil anti-
trust suit against the Studebaker Corporation of South Bend, Indiana,'
seeking to end Studebaker's allegedly illegal methods of distributing
the motor-oil additive "STP." The complaint asserted that Studebaker
fixed the prices at which its distributors could sell the additive to jobbers,
jobbers could sell to retailers, and retailers could sell to the public, thereby
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Studebaker, it was charged, also
allocated territories within which its distributors could sell, and prevented
them from selling outside of those territories. The Studebaker case is one
of several recent instances in which "territorial security" has come under
fire from the Government.
The term "territorial security" refers to arrangements under which a
wholesaler or retailer agrees not to sell outside of a specified geographical
area, or not to sell to customers who reside or have their places of
business outside of that area.' Closely related to territorial security is the
installments covering a six year period. The decision of the court to disallow deprecia-
tion undoubtedly worked a hardship on the taxpayer in meeting the necessary install-
ments. That decision tends to reduce the incentive of acquiring a small business where
the taxpayer has limited funds and resources.
150. Large firms acquired surpluses of working capital because of substantial de-
preciation charges and accumulation of profits during periods when tax rates were
lower. MASSEL, COrPEITION AND MONOPOLY 74 (1962).
151. See generally Schmidt, supra note 148.
1. United States v. Studebaker Corp., 5 TAD REG. RE,. 1 45063 (D. Neb. Oct.
31, 1963).
2. 26 Stat. 109 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) : "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. .. ."
3. The terminology relating to such arrangements is by no means uniform. Such
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"exclusive franchise," an arrangement under which a supplier assigns
his wholesaler or retailer a territory within which the supplier agrees
not to sell to anyone else.4 Territorial security is often employed in con-
junction with the exclusive franchise, with each wholesaler or retailer
being confined to his assigned territory, and each safeguarded against
"raids" on his territory by others.' Territorial security, exclusive fran-
chises, and combinations of these arrangements are referred to in this
Note as "exclusive territorial arrangements."
This Note explores the economic and legal issues which arise from
the use of exclusive territorial arrangements. Since the legality of these
arrangements cannot intelligently be evaluated without considering the
purposes they are designed to serve, and their effects on competition, the
economic issues are considered at the outset.
I. THE "ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS STUFF" 6 FROM WHICH
EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS EMERGE
A. Exclusive Franchises
When a supplier adopts an exclusive franchise system at the retail
level of distribution, he limits the number of retailers to whom he can
sell.' The question that suggests itself is why would he not sell to all
arrangements are sometimes referred to as "territorial restrictions," Note, Restricted
Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795, 796 (1962) ;
"closed territories" or "geographical customer allocation," Day, Exclusive Territorial
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws-A Reappraisal, 40 N.C.L. REv. 223, 227
(1962) ; "protected territorial distribution," Stewart, Franchise or Protected Territory
Distribution, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 447, 449 (1963), and "territorial confinement," Stewart,
Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 33, 34 (1963).
4. This type of arrangement is usually referred to in marketing literature as an
"exclusive agency." See Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman
Act, supra note 3, at 802. The exclusive franchise should not be confused with an
arrangement under which the distributor or dealer agrees to handle the supplier's product
to the exclusion of competitive products. The latter type of arrangement is referred
to as "exclusive dealing." Exclusive dealing may present problems under section 3 of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). An exclusive
dealing contract violates section 3 where the effect of such contract may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the line of commerce
affected. Tampa Elec. Co..v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). For a discussion
of exclusive dealing arrangements see Smith, Vertical Arrangement. in Antitrust Law:
Exclusive Dealing Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 18 (1963).
The term "supplier," as used in this Note, denotes one who supplies tangible products
or intangible property rights to wholesalers or retailers. The term includes manufac-
turers, prime distributors and owners of patents or trademarks. See Stewart, Franchise
or Protected Territory Distribution, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 447 (1963).
5. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, supra note 3,
at 796.
6. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (Douglas, J.)
7. Exclusive territorial arrangements may be employed at any level of distribution.
To avoid unnecessary complexity, however, these marketing systems are discussed in
this section only as they are used on the retail level.
786
NOTES,
retailers who wanted to buy his product, and benefit from the resulting
increase in retail price competition through greater sales. It may be, if
he lacks sufficient economic leverage, that he is compelled to restrict the
number of his retail outlets by those retailers who would not otherwise
sell his product.' However, if the supplier is under no such compulsion,
why would he voluntarily limit the number of retail outlets from which
he could sell his product to consumers?
It is instructive to see whether an exclusive franchise system would
be economically feasible under certain hypothetical market conditions.
Suppose that the supplier is a monopolist who sells his product directly
to retailers.' As a monopolist, he has the power to fix the wholesale
price of his product, and will do so at a level that will maximize his
profits."0 The monopolist supplier normally benefits from maximum
competition among his retailers because such competition decreases the
retail price of a product and increases supplier sales volume. When
maximum competition exists at the retail level, retailer profits are set
by market forces at a minimum level. With retailer profits at a
minimum, the supplier can exercise effective control over the retail price
of his product,"1 seeking by this means to obtain optimum sales volume."
If the supplier adopts an exclusive franchise system and thereby restricts
the number of retailers to whom he sells, competition among his retailers
decreases, retailer profits normally increase, and the supplier's control
over the retail price of his product will decrease. The less control that a
supplier has over the retail price of his product, the less certain he is that
that price will be maintained at a level which will result in optimum
supplier sales volume and maximum profit. It is obvious, then, that the
8. Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrast Laws, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 111, 113 (1962).
9. The term "monopolist" in this context refers to a person with full monopoly
power. In An'rY. GEN. NAT'L Comsa. ANTITRUST REP. 318 (1955), the term "monopoly
power" is defined as follows:
The essence of full monopoly power resides in being the sole source of a
product, so that the buyer must meet the seller's terms or go without. . . . The
basic economic aspect of monopoly is the seller's power over the terms on which
he trades. All the factors and elements which constitute this idea are summed
up by the convenient short-hand reference to monopoly power as power over
price or power to exclude competitors. Monopoly power in this sense implies the
monopoly seller's relative freedom from pressure to reduce costs, to develop
new products, or otherwise to innovate, and to diffuse the benefits among its
customers.
10. It is assumed that the wholesale price of the product will be uniform to all
retailers.
11. If retailer profits are at a minimum level, the retail price of the product
will be determined primarily by the wholesale price fixed by the supplier. Jordan,
supra note 8, at 114.
12. Id. at 113-14.
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monopolist supplier would be disinclined to adopt an exclusive franchise
system.
When the supplier is not a monopolist, but is instead a competitor
in a perfectly competitive market, 3 he is unable to affect the price of his
product by increasing or decreasing the number of retailers who sell
his product because he has no control over the competitive market forces
which determine product price. Under such conditions, it is not advan-
tageous for the supplier to restrict the number of retailers to whom he
sells. 4
Thus, the adoption of an exclusive franchise system would be un-
wise in situations where the price of a product is controlled by a
monopolist or is determined by the forces of perfect competition. How-
ever, the perfectly monopolistic and perfectly competitive markets dis-
cussed above are not intended to, and do not, describe reality. 5 Actual
markets are neither perfectly competitive nor perfectly monopolistic; they
contain both monopolistic and competitive elements. Any realistic ap-
praisal of exclusive franchise systems must, therefore, be conducted
against a background of imperfectly competitive markets. 6
In an imperfectly competitive market, all retailers are not perfect
substitutes for each other; consequently, consumers may prefer some
retailers to others. Consumer preferences for retailers, or "consumer-
retailer attachments," are especially important where the purchase of a
product requires a large capital expenditure by the consumer.' If a
consumer purchases an automobile, for example, and that automobile
turns out to be a "lemon," the consumer may suffer substantial financial
loss. To avoid risk, he may prefer to patronize a well established retailer
with whom he has had previous experience, relying upon that retailer
to "stand behind" the product and to correct any defects in it. The
consumer's selection of a brand may be affected by the existence of such
13. The term "perfectly competitive market" denotes a hypothetical market in
which the following conditions are fulfilled: the products of all rival sellers in the
market are perfect substitutes for each other; all buyers and sellers have perfect
knowledge of the market and complete indifference as to their customers or sources
of supply; the number of sellers is so large that no one seller produces more than a
negligible share of the market supply; new firms can enter the market with the same
costs as existing firms; and all buyers and sellers in the market have mobility. The
term does not purport to indicate ideal conditions. ATr'y. GEN. NATL Comm. ANTITRUST
RE. 316, 337 (1955).
14. Jordan, supra note 8, at 114.
15. ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L COMm. ANTITRUST R'EP. 315-42 (1955).
16. "Imperfectly competitive" markets are markets which contain both monopolistic
and competitive elements. The standard work on such markets is CHAMBERLIN, THEORY
OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 1957).
17. On the other hand, when a consumer purchases a low-priced, relatively standard-
ized product, such as toothpaste, he tends to purchase at the most convenient outlet.
Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, sopra note 3, at 795.
a retailer if the consumer's preference for a particular brand-the "con-
sumer-brand attachment"-is not a compelling factor in his purchase.
If the retailer should go out of business because, for example, he finds
it unprofitable, consumer-retailer attachments and, perhaps, consumer-
brand attachments, will be broken. Consumers who previously patronized
the defunct retailer must collect market information anew, and an increase
in market knowledge might lead them to purchase other brands.1 8
If consumer-retailer attachments account for a sufficiently large
percentage of the total sales of a supplier's product, the supplier may
find it profitable to preserve such attachments by maintaining a relatively
stable group of retailers." One way for the supplier to stabilize his dealer
organization is to adopt an exclusive franchise system."0
A supplier may derive many benefits from limiting the number of
retailers to whom he sells his product. He may be able to attract better
dealers by offering them exclusive franchises,2 and he may achieve
higher sales volume by selling to these selected dealers.22 Moreover, by
selling to a minimum number of dealers, the supplier can reduce his
selling costs and more accurately estimate future demand for his
product."  Selling to a limited number of dealers may be desirable
if the supplier's product is a "prestige" product, or one which requires
specialized selling or servicing techniques which the supplier must control
in order to protect his good will. Finally, by offering an exclusive
franchise, the supplier may be able to induce the dealer to handle the
supplier's product to the exclusion of competitive products.25
18. PASHIGIAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILES, AN ECONOMic ANALYSIS
OF THE FRANCHISE SYSTEm 38, 43 (Ford Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Series, 1960
Award Winner, 1961).
19. Id. at 38. A policy of maintaining a relatively stable group of retailers may
develop consumer-retailer attachments and, hence, consumer-brand attachments at a
lower cost to the supplier than any other sales promotion policy. Id. at 37-38.
20. Id. at 38-39. By limiting the number of his retailers, the supplier may help
protect his retailers from incurring losses which would cause them to go out of business.
Ibid.
An exclusive franchise system is not likely to be adopted unless at least two
market conditions exist: first, consumer-retailer attachments must account for a
sufficiently high percentage of the supplier's total sales; and, second, economies of
scale in distribution must preclude the existence of many efficient retailers in each
market. Id. at 32, 44.
21. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66
YALE L.J. 1135, 1136 (1957).
22. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, supra note
3, at 805; Pashigian, op. cit. supra note 18, at 26-41.
23. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, supra note
3, at 805.
24. Jordan, supra note 8, at 116-20.
25. Id. at 117. Under certain circumstances, such an exclusive dealing arrangement
may run afoul of the antitrust laws. See note 4 supra.
NOTES 789
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An exclusive franchise may also be beneficial to the franchised
dealer. Indeed, potential dealers often demand exclusive franchises as
their price for making substantial investment in a dealership26 because
that investment will be better protected if the number of the supplier's
outlets is restricted. An exclusively franchised dealer may derive some
benefit from the supplier's good will. Additionally, the profit rates of
dealers operating under an exclusive franchise system tend to be higher
than those of retailers who do not operate under such a system." From
the dealer's point of view, however, the main advantage of an exclusive
franchise system is that it affords him protection against intrabrand
competition.2"
The exclusive franchise system can also benefit the consumer. Since
the system tends to produce a relatively stable group of retailers, the
consumer may be able to purchase from a dealer who has been in
business for a number of years and with whom the consumer has had
prior dealings. 9 Also, the consumer may receive better service from an
exclusively franchised dealer than he otherwise would, and he may be able
to purchase from a more complete stock of the supplier's products.3"
Like all marketing systems, however, the exclusive franchise ar-
rangement has its disadvantages. The supplier, of course, will likely
suffer if the dealer does not perform satisfactorily. The dealer's business
may be very adversely affected if the supplier terminates his franchise,
especially if the business is based upon exclusive representation."' And
the exclusive franchise arrangement can adversely affect the public.
Retail prices tend to be higher under an exclusive franchise system than
under a system in which intrabrand competition is unrestricted, and the
entry into the market of more efficient retailers tends to be forestalled.32
B. Territorial Security
It is evident from the above that under certain circumstances a
supplier may find it profitable to restrict intrabrand competition. One
way for the supplier to do this is to adopt an exclusive franchise system.
26. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherna Act, supra note
3, at 805-09.
27. PASHIGIAN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 14-21.
28. Note, Restricted Channels of Distriution Under the Shernzan Act, supra note
3, at 809. The term "intrabrand competition" denotes competition between persons who
sell the same brand. It should not be confused with competition between persons who
sell different brands. The latter type is referred to as "interbrand competition."
29. PASHIGIAN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 38. Dealership turnover rates tend to be
relatively low and dealership life expectancies tend to be relatively high under an
exclusive franchise system. Id. at 21-24.
30. Kessler, supra note 21, at 1136.
31. Ibid.
32. PASHlIIAN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 14, 42.
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However, to the extent that retailers or consumers are mobile, i.e., able
and willing to travel for the purpose of selling or buying a product, an
exclusive franchise system may not effectively protect retailers from
intrabrand competition.33 In such a situation the supplier may find it
advantageous to resort to territorial security in order to protect his
retailers from intrabrand competition. Territorial security not only helps
protect the retailer from "raids" on his territory by other retailers selling
the same brand, but also encourages him to develop the full sales po-
tential of his territory. 4
Territorial security and exclusive franchises emerge from the same
"economic and business stuff," and have substantially the same advant-
ages and disadvantages.3"
C. The Net Economic Effects of Exclusive Territorial Arrangements
Exclusive territorial arrangements restrict intrabrand competition
to varying degrees; the effect of an arrangement on such competition
depends upon the percentage of the relevant market foreclosed, as well
as upon the vigor of the remaining competition, at each level of distri-
bution. An exclusive territorial arrangement may have an inhibitory
effect on interbrand competition where either the supplier or his dealers
occupy dominant positions.36 However, where neither the supplier nor
33. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, supra note
3, at 809-11.
34. Jordan, supra note 8, at 120. A raid by one retailer on another's territory -will
often constitute an attempt to take away the raided dealer's best accounts, since it may
cost the raiding retailer less to obtain such accounts than to cultivate the less lucrative
accounts in his own area. If the raided retailer loses his best accounts, he may go out
of business, or may engage in retaliatory raids. In either event, the less lucrative
accounts are likely to go by default to other brands, thereby decreasing the supplier's
share of the market. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,
supra note 3, at 811-13.
To the extent that a raiding dealer makes sales that would have been made by the
raided dealer anyway, duplicated dealer efforts dissipate available promotional funds
with no return to the supplier. By preventing an overlap of dealer efforts, territorial
security enables the supplier to make a more efficient allocation of his dealers'
resources. Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman
Act, 30 U. Cmi. L. REv. 286, 310-11 (1963).
35. Territorial security may be enforced by terminating the franchise of any retailer
who engages in raids, or by requiring the raiding dealer to "pass over" all or some
of the profit he makes on each raid to the raided dealer. Note, Restricted Channels of
Distribution Under the Sherman Act, supra note 3, at 814-17. If territorial security
is enforced by the latter method, interbrand competition is not necessarily completely
eliminated, since the extent to which such competition is restricted depends upon the
extent of the pass-over.
36. See Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941), for an
example of how exclusive territorial arrangements, if used by dominant suppliers,
may inhibit interbrand competition at the dealer level by driving competing dealers out
of business. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), illustrates
how exclusive territorial arrangements, if used in conjunction with other trade
practices by dominant distributors, may inhibit interbrand competition at the supplier
level by denying competing suppliers a market for their products.
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dealers are in a dominant position, an exclusive territorial arrange-
ment may stimulate interbrand competition in the long run. 7 This would
be particularly true where the supplier is a small factor in the industry,
or where it is in a competitively vulnerable position because it is a new
entrant or a failing company. 8 The fact that exclusive territorial
arrangements may restrain as well as stimulate interbrand competition
raises the issue of whether such arrangements are legally justifiable.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Exclusive Franchises
It seems to be established that an exclusive franchise is not illegal
under the antitrust laws unless it is effected by a party or parties with
monopoly power, or is without a legitimate business purpose."9 The
reasonableness of an exclusive franchise is evaluated by determining
whether the arrangement affords only fair protection to the interests of
the party in whose favor it is given, and does not impose a restraint so
large as to interfere with the interests of the public."0
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,41 the district court
condemned an elaborate distribution scheme designed to fix the resale
price of pink-tinted eyeglass lenses, but upheld a separable exclusive
franchise agreement conceived to provide a source of supply for the
distributor. The court said that the exclusive franchise agreement was
needed to protect the distributor's investment in developing good will
and enlarging the public patronage of a relatively new article of com-
37. Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors, 22
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcToN 33, 37 (1963) ; Day, supra note 3, at 249.
38. Stewart, supra note 37, at 37. The less powerful the supplier, the more difficult
it may be for it to establish and maintain a dealer organization without employing
exclusive territorial arrangements. Robinson, Restraints of Trade and the Orderly
Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNEL L.Q. 254, 259 (1960).
39. Where an exclusive franchise "forms part of an attempt to monopolize pro-
hibited by Section 2 [of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1958)], or the lesser degree of unreasonable restraint prohibited by Section 1, it
should be held a violation." On the other hand, where an exclusive franchise "is merely
an ancillary restraint, reasonably necessary to protect the parties' main lawful business
purposes," such a franchise "should be upheld where its effect is not unreasonably to
foreclose competition from the dealer's market." Air'Y. GEN. NAT'I Comx. ANTITRUST
RiP. 29 (1955).
The following business purposes have been held sufficient to support an exclusive
franchise: the simple sale of goods to a dealer; the service, repair and trade-in re-
sponsibility of a dealer; the lease or sale of equipment for use by a dealer; the right
to use trademarks or trade names; and the right to use controlled specifications or
patents. Stewart, Franchise or Protected Territory Distriution, 8 ANTITRUST BULL.
447, 466 (1963).
40. ATr'v. GEN. NAT'L Coam. ANTITRUST REP. 27 (1955).
41. 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd as modified, 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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Since Bausc & Lomb, the Government has rarely challenged the
legality of exclusive franchises. Most recent suits attacking them have
been instituted by private parties, and these attempts have been notably
unsuccessful.43 In two such suits, Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales
Corp."' and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.," former
automobile dealers in Baltimore brought actions against automobile
manufacturers for treble damages on account of the termination of their
franchises. The manufacturers involved were much smaller than the
"big three" in the autorfiotive industry, and both had experienced declines
in their respective market shares.
The plaintiffs in Schwing alleged that the manufacturer terminated
its dealerships in Baltimore in favor of another dealer who had been
granted an exclusive franchise in the Baltimore area. The court dismissed
the case, stating that exclusive franchise agreements are not unlawful
unless they are used to violate the antitrust laws. The court said:
[T]he mere fact that such an agreement necessarily gives the
dealer a monopoly in handling the product of the particular
manufacturer in a givern area, and thereby enables the dealer to
dictate the price at which the products of that manufacturer
shall be sold in that area, subject to competition with the
products of other manufacturers, does not condemn such agree-
ments; otherwise all exclusive agency agreements would be
illegal per se.4'
In the Packard case, the plaintiff alleged that the largest of three
Packard dealers in Baltimore told Packard that it would stop selling
their automobiles unless it was granted an exclusive franchise. Packard
thereupon informed the plaintiff that its franchise would be discontinued
in one year. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff after a
trial, but the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court,
stating that an exclusive franchise is lawful if it is not part of a scheme
to monopolize, and if effective competition exists at both supplier and
dealer levels. The court of appeals, recognizing the legitimate business
42. The district court's decision on the exclusive franchise agreement was upheld
by an equally divided Supreme Court. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
43. See, e.g., Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953); Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe Am. Corp, 201
F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953). For a list of cases upholding
exclusive franchises, see Robinson, Restraints of Trade and the Orderly Marketing of
Goods, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 254, 257 (1960).
44. 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. MId.), aff'd, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 822 (1957).
45. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
46. 138 F. Supp. at 903.
793NOTES
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reasons which often lead to the adoption of an exclusive franchise
system, said:
The short of it is that a relatively small manufacturer,
competing with large manufacturers, thought it advantageous
to retain its largest dealer in Baltimore, and could not do so
without agreeing to drop its other Baltimore dealers. To
penalize a small manufacturer for competing in this way not
only fails to promote the policy of the antitrust laws but de-
feats it.47
More recently, in United States v. White Motor Co.,48 the district
court said, and the Government seemed to concede, that exclusive
franchises are lawful when ancillary to a lawful main purpose.4"
B. Territorial Security
The law relating to territorial security provisions in general is
unsettled, although it seems well established that a patent or trademark
may form the basis of a lawful license agreement containing territorial
security provisions.50 The early cases uniformly held that territorial
47. 243 F.2d at 421.
48. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 372 U.S. 253
(1963).
49. 194 F. Supp. at 578, 372 U.S. at 271 n.11.
50. Stewart, Franchise or Protected Territory Distribution, 8 ANTITRUST BuLL. 447,
461-66 (1963); Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confitwment of Dis-
tributors, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 33, 43-44 (1963). It should be noted, however,
that under decisions of the Supreme Court, the purchaser of a patented article in one
part of the United States may resell it anywhere in the United States, despite any
territorial restrictions placed upon him by the patentee. This rule is an outgrowth of
the notion that the first authorized sale of a patented article "exhausts" the patent
monopoly. ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST Rss'. 236-37, 240-41 (1955). It is
doubtful whether the owner of a trademark may impose valid territorial restrictions
on the purchaser of a trademarked article. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944); CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITI oN AND TRADE-
MARKS § 15.5 (Supp. 1963).
If the owner of a patent or trademark wishes to territorially confine the distributors
of a patented or trademarked product manufactured by him, he may be required to retain
title to the product and license the distributors to sell the product for him. If he
retains title to the product until it is sold to the ultimate consumer, he is thereby
subjected to substantial economic and legal burdens which he would not otherwise be
required to bear. Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of
Distributors, 22 A.B.A. ANTIRUST SEcT N 33, 39-40, 43-44 (1963). The validity of an
agreement under which a supplier retains title to goods until they are sold to the
ultimate consumer may depend upon such factors as payment by the supplier of
casualty insurance premiums, property taxes and the cost of inventory maintenance,
accounting and policing; payment by the dealer to the supplier only after sale to the
ultimate consumer; and the right of the dealer to return unsold goods to the supplier.
A supplier who retains title to goods until they are sold to consumers may be subjected
to legal burdens such as increased liability in tort and contract to consumers. Id. at
39-40, 43.
Since a patent license restriction is invalid unless at least a substantial portion(or perhaps all) of the product is patented, most manufactured products could not be
NOTES
security was lawful when reasonably necessary to protect the parties'
valid business purposes." Recently, however, the Government has been
challenging the legality of such provisions, primarily on the assertion
that territorial security so closely resembles two traditionally outlawed
arrangements-horizontal market division 2 and resale price mainten-
anceP3-that it, too, ought to be declared illegal per se. The development
of the law relating to territorial security is traced in the material that
follows.
Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co.,5" a case which illustrates the
early attitude of courts toward territorial security, upheld the right of
a cement manufacturer to recover damages from a cement jobber, where
the subject of a territorially restricted patent license agreement. Id. at 43.
Until recently, there was some authority to indicate that territorial security, even
if generally condemned as illegal per se, would be lawful under a bona fide consignment
agreement. In United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), the Court
upheld consignment agreements which contained resale price restrictions, although
such restrictions are generally condemned as illegal per se. The Court said: "The owner
of an article patented or othervise is not violating the common law or the Anti-Trust
Act by seeking to dispose of his articles directly to the consumer and fixing the price
by which his agents transfer the title from him directly to such consumer." Id. at 488.
However, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13 (1964), the Court, with-
out expressly overruling General Electric, invalidated consignment agreements which
were virtually indistinguishable from the agreements involved in General Electric except
for the fact that the articles sold in General Electric were patented, whereas the com-
modity sold in Simnpson was unpatented. In Atlantic Refining Co., No. 7471, FTC,
TRADE REG. REP., 1961-63 Transfer Binder 1 16422 (May 16, 1963), the Commission
condemned the use of consignment agreements to control retail prices during gasoline
"price wars." The latter case is now pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. 3 TRADE PE. REP. 25901 (October 26, 1964).
51. The legality of territorial security has been upheld in a number of cases, both
state and federal. See, e.g., Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963) ;
Johnston v. Franklin Kirk Co., 83 Ind. App. 519, 148 N.E. 177 (1925). For a list of
cases upholding such provisions, see Robinson, sufra note 43, at 261.
Several bills have been introduced in Congress to permit the use of territorial
security, but none have been enacted. See, e.g., H.R. 567, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
For a discussion of prior bills, see Heuerman, Dealer Territorial Security and "Boot-
legging" in the Auto Industr3, 1962 Wis. L. Rav. 486. The passage of such legislation
appears unlikely unless a rule of per se illegality is eventually applied to territorial
security situations.
52. Horizontal market division is illegal per se. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). But cf. United States v. National Football
League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), in which the court held illegal certain
by-laws of the National Football League, but upheld a by-law under which telecasts
of outside professional football games were "blacked out" in the home territories of
other teams on days when the other teams were playing at home. The court declared
that "this . . . is a clear case of allocating territories between competitors, which
is a practice generally held illegal under the antitrust laws." Id. at 322. However, the
court concluded that the restraint was reasonable, stating: "This particular restriction
promotes competition more than it restrains it in that its immediate effect is to protect
the weak teams and its ultimate effect is to preserve the League itself." Id. at 325.
53. Unless legalized under "Fair Trade" statutes, resale price maintenance agree-
ments are illegal per se. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911).
54. 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904).
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the jobber breached his contract with the manufacturer by refusing to
accept part of a quantity of cement which the jobber had ordered. The
jobber's defense was based upon the contention that the contract was
illegal under the Sherman Act because it prevented him from reselling
or shipping the cement outside of the State of Texas. The court rejected
this contention, finding that the manufacturer had no monopoly of the
manufacture or sale of cement in the country, and that if territorial con-
finement of the jobber prevented him from competing with other jobbers
or manufacturers outside of the State of Texas, the restriction was a
mere "indirect and immaterial incident" of the contract rather than
its major purpose or effect.5 Phillips has little present significance,
because the court did not consider the arguments now being made against
territorial security by the Government.
Not until 1932 was there a reported case in which territorial
security was compared to horizontal market division and resale price
maintenance. In that year the Federal Trade Commission dismissed a
complaint which charged the General Cigar Co. with violating section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act"8 by territorially confining its
distributors. 7 The Commission gave no reasons for dismissing the com-
plaint. Commissioner McCulloch, in dissent, argued that territorial se-
curity should be held illegal per se because it has the same effect as an
illegal horizontal agreement between distributors to divide territories.
The Commissioner also compared territorial security to resale price
maintenance. He argued that territorial security, like resale price main-
tenance, should be relegated to per se illegality because it prevents intra-
brand competition between distributors. 8 The arguments advanced by
Commissioner McCulloch more than 30 years ago remain the principal
legal arguments against territorial security provisions."
The district court in Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,)"
55. 125 Fed. at 595.
56. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
57. General Cigar Co., 16 F.T.C. 537 (1932). See Sealy, Inc., 45 F.T.C. 730 (1948),
in which the Commission dismissed a complaint alleging territorial confinement of
mattress manufacturers operating under trademark licenses. See also Columbus Coated
Fabrics Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1500 (1959), in which charges relating to territorial security
were dismissed because there was no substantial evidence to indicate that the supplier
policed the arrangement. In Snap-On Tools Corp., No. 7116, FTC, TRADE REG. REP.,
1961-63 Transfer Binder 1 15546, at 20413 n.8 (Nov. 1, 1961), the Commission said
that the General Cigar case has little present significance.
58. 16 F.T.C. at 537-38.
59. Another argument against territorial security is based upon language in
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944), that a seller
"may not lawfully limit by agreement, express or implied, the . . . persons to whom
its purchaser may resell. .. ."
60. 37 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.) rehearing
denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
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upon its view of the facts, went very far toward upholding the legality
of all territorial security arrangements when it upheld the territorial
confinement of Chevrolet dealers by General Motors. The Boro Hall
case was an action by a Chevrolet dealer to recover treble damages under
the Sherman Act on the ground that General Motors had refused to
permit it to establish a used-car outlet, lot or salesroom outside of its
so-called "zone of influence." Without considering the affidavits of the
parties, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege
such a restraint as would violate the antitrust laws.6" The court found
reasonable the defendants' attempts to prevent the plaintiff from trading
upon the defendants' name in an area where that name had been dele-
gated to others. 2
The court of appeals did not go as far as the district court had in
upholding the legality of territorial security. Relying upon an uncon-
tradicted affidavit of the defendants, the court said that the dealer was
not prohibited from selling used cars outside of its zone, but was pre-
vented only from establishing a used-car outlet "at such place as
would . . . unduly prejudice other dealers who did business with the
seller." 2 The court did not view this as an unreasonable interference
with competition. 4 The court found, in denying a petition for rehearing,
that there was sufficient competition in the low-price car field in the
dealer's market, and that the restrictive agreement had no tendency to
monopolize trade."2
Shortly after the Second World War, the Government began its
attacks on territorial security; the automobile manufacturers, who were
among the most important suppliers with territorially confined dealers,
were its first target. Between 1949 and 1952, the automobile manu-
facturers succumbed to pressure from the Department of Justice, and
eliminated territorial security clauses from their dealer franchise con-
tracts. 0 The Government then brought actions against numerous other
suppliers whose dealers were confined to specified geographical areas,
and all but two of these actions ended in consent decrees under which
the suppliers were enjoined from restricting the territories in which their
distributors could sell. 7 The Government did not encounter much
61. 37 F. Supp. at 1000.
62. Id. at 1001.
63. 124 F.2d at 823.
64. Ibid.
65. 130 F.2d at 197.
66. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66
YALE L.J. 1135, 1148 (1957).
67. See 1 TRADE REG. REP. 3040.842-.856. The two actions which did not end in
such decrees were United States v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 405
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resistance because it was often willing to settle for consent decrees con.
taining provisions which expressly permitted suppliers to designate areas
of primary responsibility for their distributors." Under such provisions,
distributors are not barred from selling outside of their areas of primary
responsibility, but their franchises may be terminated if they fail to
adequately represent their suppliers within the specified areas. 9
Not until United States v. Volkswagen of Ainerica, Inc.7 ° did a
supplier contest an attack by the Department of Justice on territorial
security. In Volkswagen, it was charged that the sole importer of
Volkswagen automobiles and 14 Volkswagen distributors were engaged
in an unlawful conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,
because the Volkswagen distribution system involved resale price main-
tenance and territorial security. The court, in denying the defendants'
motion to dismiss the part of the complaint concerning the territorial
security provisions, said that even if such provisions were legal by them-
selves, they might be illegal if part of an illegal price-fixing scheme.
The Volkswagen case ended in a consent decree under which the de-
fendants were prohibited from entering into agreements to fix the resale
prices of Volkswagens. The charges relating to territorial security were
dismissed on the agreement of the importer to notify its distributors that
(D.N.J. 1960) (defendants' motion for partial dismissal denied), TRADE REG. RP\P.
(1962 Trade Cas.) 70256 (D.N.J. 1962) (consent decree which did not ban territorial
security; the Government dropped the charges relating to territorial security in return
for a concession by one of the defendants) ; and White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
68. See 1 TRADE REG. REP. 3040.49-.495.
69. The consent decree in United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., TRADE REG.
REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) 169011, at 74008 (W.D.N.Y. 1958) contains a typical provision
permitting a supplier to designate areas of primary responsibility for its distributors:
".. . Wurlitzer may exercise its right from time to time to choose and select
its distributors and customers and to designate geographical areas within which
a distributor may agree to devote his best efforts to the sale of coin-operated
phonographs and may terminate the contract of any distributor who may fail to
devote his best efforts to the sale in the area so designated of coin-operated
phonographs manufactured by Wurlitzer or to represent Wurlitzer adequately
in said area. .. ."
The legality of primary responsibility provisions is not beyond question. See
Stewart, Excluaive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors, 22 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SEcTioN 33, 41-43 (1963). Since primary responsibility provisions allow
a supplier to discontinue dealing with distributors who fail to observe previously an-
nounced conditions, such provisions may be protected by the doctrine announced in
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). In the Colgate case, the Court
held that a supplier may refuse to deal with distributors who fail to sell at prices
recommended by the supplier. Although the Colgate doctrine has not yet been over-
ruled, there is not much life left in it. Halper, Individual Refuisals to Deal: Customer
Selection or Dealer Protection?, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTIo 49 (1963).
70. 182 F. Supp. 562 (D.N.J. 1960) (defendants' motion for partial dismissal
denied), TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 170256 (D.N.J. 1962) (consent decree).
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they could sell and service other makes of automobiles.
A similar attack on territorial security was resisted by a supplier in
United States v. White Motor Co.7 The defendant truck manufacturer
was charged with conspiring with its distributors and dealers to confine
their sales to customers located in designated territories, to refrain from
selling to certain customers reserved to White and, in specified cases,
to sell at prices fixed by White. White contended that the restrictive
provisions of its contracts were designed to enable it, as a small manu-
facturer, to hold its own against giant competitors. The district court
entered a summary judgment for the Government, holding that the price-
fixing aspects of White's distribution system, which affected only a
small share of White's total business, constituted per se violations of the
Sherman Act." The district court also condemned as illegal per se the
provisions of White's contracts which restricted its distributors and
dealers territorially and restrained them from selling to certain reserved
customers. 3 On appeal, White did not challenge the district court's
ruling that the price-fixing provisions of its contracts were unlawful,
and the Government did not contend that, as in Bausch & Lomb, price
fixing was such "an integral part of the whole distribution system" 4 as to
render the entire scheme illegal. However, White did challenge the
court's ruling that its customer and territorial restrictions constituted
per se violations of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-3 decision, reversed and remanded
the case to the district court for trial. The Court held that a trial was
necessary to determine whether the customer and territorial restrictions
should be branded illegal per se. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, said that the tribunal did not know enough of the economic and
business stuff which precipitate such arrangements to allow it to decide
whether they should be declared illegal per se merely on the basis of the
documentary evidence before it."5 Reviewing cases which involved
practices condemned as illegal per se, Douglas concluded that per se
illegality has been reserved for "naked restraints of trade with no purpose
except stifling of competition.""' He said that White's customer and
territorial restrictions "may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be
allowable protection against aggressive competitors or the-only practi-
cable means a small competitor has for breaking into or staying in busi-
71. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
72. 194 F. Supp. at 576-77.
73. Id. at 585-87.
74. 321 U.S. at 720.
75. 372 U.S. at 261-63.
76. Id. at 263.
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ness . . . and within the 'rule of reason.' ,,7
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, thought that it would
be difficult to justify White's customer restrictions, since they vitiated
all competition between manufacturer and distributors for the best
accounts."8 He indicated that the customer restrictions could not be
justified if the distributors were capable of competing "in any mean-
ingful sense"7 with White for the reserved accounts. However, he said
that the territorial restrictions-at least if imposed by White without
coercion from its distributors and dealers-could give rise to vigorous
interbrand competition that otherwise might not occur.8" In response
to the Government's contention that territorial restrictions should be de-
dared illegal per se because they closely resemble horizontal market di-
vision and resale price maintenance, Mr. Justice Brennan found the
analogies "instructive" but perhaps "misleading."'" It seemed to him
that the similarities had obscured the important differences which dis-
tinguish territorial restrictions from other practices to which a per se
test is appropriate. "The crucial question," he said, "whether, despite
differences in form, these restraints serve the same pernicious purpose
and have the same inhibitory effects on competition as horizontal di-
visions of markets, is one which cannot be answered without a trial."8 "
With respect to the analogy to resale price maintenance, he stated that
resale price maintenance is designed to, and almost always does, reduce
both intrabrand and interbrand competition, whereas territorial security
does not necessarily have that effect.84
Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Black, dissented on the ground that White's territorial security
provisions had a tendency to restrain competition among its distributors
just as surely as would a horizontal agreement among distributors and
dealers.85 The dissenters were convinced that the remand was futile since
White "cannot plead nor [sic] prove an issue upon which a successful
defense of its contracts can be predicated."8 "
In several cases decided by the Federal Trade Commission before
the Supreme Court decision in White Motor, the Federal Trade Commis-
77. Ibid.
78. Id. at 272.
79. Id. at 272-73.
80. Id. at 268.
81. Id at 266.
82. Id. at 266-67.
83. Id. at 267-68.
84. Id. at 268.
85. Id. at 279.
86. Id. at 282.
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sion declared distribution systems under which distributors were terri-
torially confined to be unlawful."s One of these cases, Snap-On. Tools
Corp.,8" involved a tool manufacturer's nationwide distribution system
under which franchised dealers purchased tools from the manufacturer
and resold the tools out of mobile, walk-in trucks, covering routes in
assigned territories. The FTC held that the distribution system violated
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by fixing resale prices,
geographically restricting markets, limiting customers and restricting
dealers' rights to compete after the terfriination of their franchises. The
Commission held that the restrictive provisions of the manufacturer's
contracts with its dealers were part of an integrated distribution scheme,
the purpose and effect of which was to prevent competition at the dealer
level. Snap-On's territorial restrictions, in the Commission's opinion,
"contributed to the illegality of its over-all distribution system.""9 The
Commission concluded that "some of these practices might not be illegal
standing alone [but] we believe it necessary in the public interest, and in
the exercise of our responsibility to provide effective relief, that the order
ban them individually at least until such time as their collective effect
on competition has been completely erased."9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set aside the Com-
mission's order requiring the manufacturer to cease and desist from en-
gaging in the challenged practices. The court held that there was no
basis in the record as a whole for considering the restrictive provisions
of the dealer contract collectively, and that none of those provisions, con-
sidered individually, were illegal.
Under the dealer contract, each Snap-On dealer was given an
exclusive franchise to sell products within the territory described in the
contract, subject to the manufacturer's right to sell to certain accounts.
The contract provided that the dealer could sell Snap-On products only
within the described territory, though he was left free to sell to customers
who came to him from outside of his territory.9 The court thought that
87. Snap-On Tools Corp., No. 7116, FTC, TRADE REG. REP., 1961-63 Transfer
Binder 15546 (Nov. 1, 1961), rev'd, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Sandura Co., No.
7042, FTC, TRADE RE . REP., 1961-63 Transfer Binder 15945 (June 13, 1962) ; Inter-
national Staple & Mach. Co., No. 8083, FTC, TRADE REG. REs'. 15554 (Sept. 21, 1961).
88. No. 7116, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1961-63 Transfer Binder 15546, at 20413.
89. Ibid.
90. Id. at 20416.
91. 321 F.2d at 830-32. In its opinion the court did not say whether it was realistic
to expect customers to travel outside of one sales territory to purchase hand tools from a
dealer in another territory. Because of the nature of the product and the method of
distribution, it is possible that Snap-On's territorial restrictions were just as effective
as restrictions which prohibit sales to customers who reside or have their places of
business outside of the dealer's assigned territory.
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Snap-On's territorial restrictions were prompted by legitimate business
considerations and were not unlawful, noting that Snap-On was not a
monopolist and that competition in the hand tools industry was "bitter
and bloody."92 The court rejected the Commission's contention that the
public is entitled to the benefit of intrabrand competition, stating that the
antitrust laws should not restrict or prevent the orderly marketing of
products, but rather should encourage manufacturers to promote inter-
brand competition.13
The court brushed aside the 'Commission's suggestion that Snap-On
revise its dealer contract, assigning the dealers areas of primary, rather
than exclusive, responsibility:
We think that petitioner's argument against this proposal is
sound. It says that if the dealer contracts are rewritten so as
to describe each dealer's territory as a "primary zone of influ-
ence," and if Snap-On policed adequate sales and service cover-
age, it would in practice duplicate the effect of the existing
provision and "would be a sterile exercise in language," because
the dealers are free even under the existing provision to sell to
any customers (regardless of the customer's permanent loca-
tion) who wish to come to a dealer's assigned territory. If the
Commission's proposal means less than this, we believe that it
would only tend to promote friction and misunderstanding
among the dealers. What is actually meant by a "primary zone
of influence," and who is going to be the roving interpreter of
the term's meaning? We think these are pertinent questions
which militate against the Commission's suggestion. 4
Sandura Co." involved a relatively small, short-line manufacturer
of hard-surface floor coverings in an industry dominated by large firms.
The Federal Trade Commission accused Sandura of establishing an
illegal distribution scheme under which its distributors and dealers could
sell only within assigned exclusive territories, distributors could sell only
to approved dealers, dealers could sell to other dealers only if the latter
were approved by the manufacturer, and distributors and dealers could
sell only at or above prices recommended by the manufacturer. The
hearing examiner held that Sandura's territorial restrictions were illegal
per se, but the Commission did not go that far, holding that Sandura's
methods of distribution, considered as a whole, violated section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Some evidence in the record tended
92. Id. at 833.
93. Ibid.
94. Id. at 832.
95. No. 7042, FTC, TADE REG. REP., 1961-63 Transfer Binder f115945 (June 13,
1962). This case is now pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. See 3 TRADE REc. REP. 25901 (October 26, 1964).
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to show that Sandura established its territorial restrictions as an
emergency measure to aid reestablishment after nearly becoming insol-
vent. However, the Commission said that the record did not support
Sandura's contention that it needed the territorial restrictions in order
to effectively compete with its larger rivals."6
White Motor and Snap-On Tools are the most significant of the
cases dealing with territorial security. The significance of White Motor
lies in the refusal of the Court to blindly accept the Government's com-
parisons of territorial security to horizontal market division and resale
price maintenance, and in the indications in the majority and concurring
opinions that territorial security provisions would not be relegated to
per se illegality if it can be demonstrated that they are economically
justifiable and do not have the same purposes or effects as the arrange-
ments which have traditionally constituted the "hard core" antitrust
violations. Snap-On Tools is significant because the court repudiated
the Government's analogies to horizontal market division and resale price
maintenance, and said that territorial security should not be declared
illegal per se merely because it restricts intrabrand competition. Although
these two cases do not contain intelligible standards by which the legality
of territorial security arrangements can be evaluated, they do indicate
a trend, for the present at least, away from the adoption of a rule of
per se illegality for such arrangements.
III. A LEGAL EVALUATION OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY
Territorial security restricts intrabrand competition, and in that
respect is admittedly analogous to resale price maintenance and hori-
zontal market division. However, it does not follow from this fact that
territorial security should be declared illegal per se, since a single identi-
fiable effect of different kinds of transactions is not necessarily dis-
positive in the same way of their legality under the antitrust laws.97 For
96. Commissioner Maclntyre, dissenting, said that the Commission had "delivered
a one-two punch" to Sandura. Id. at 20774. He thought that the Commission should
"take a broad perspective and weigh the public interest in the survival of the respondent
against the theoretical possibility of a pygmy inflicting monopoly conditions in the
sale and distribution of hard surface floor coverings." Id. at 20773.
97. Robinson, Restraints of Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNELL
L.Q. 254, 267 (1960). There are many situations in which transactions with the same
effects have different legal consequences. For example, an agreement between a sup-
plier and his dealers to fix resale prices is illegal in the absence of a "Fair Trade" statute
which legalizes such an agreement. However, the supplier may be able to achieve the
same result by refusing to deal with dealers who do not resell at prices recommended
b, the supplier. Similarly, concerted action may violate the antitrust laws in situations
in which individual action having the same effect may be lawful. Expansion of corpora-
tions by merger may be unlawful in cases in which expansion by internal growth would
be lawful. Ibid.
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example, forward integration eliminates intrabrand competition, but it
is clear that this, without more, is lawful. 8 As a matter of fact, there are
several important ways in which territorial security is distinguishable
from resale price maintenance and horizontal market division, which
taken together suggest that the three need not be and should not be
accorded analogous legal treatment.
Resale price maintenance not only restrains intrabrand competition,
but it may also restrain interbrand competition by depriving distributors
of sufficient pricing flexibility to compete effectively with the dis-
tributors of rival brands.99 On the other hand, territorial security enables
distributors to retain all of the competitive tools with which to compete
with rival brand distributors."0 Moreover, in resale price maintenance
and horizontal market division, the anticompetitive intent is clear and
unmistakable.10' In a territorial security arrangement, however, the intent
is more ambiguous, since the restriction of intrabrand competition in the
latter instance is usually ancillary to some larger business purpose."0 2
Under the antitrust laws, weight must be given to the intent and purpose
of particular conduct.' Since the primary purpose of territorial security
98. Day, Exchsive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws-A Re-
appraisal, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 223, 249 (1962).
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Per se rules are analyzed as follows in NEALE, ANTITRUST LAws OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 429-30 (1960) :
It is sometimes thought that per se rules give effect to empirical generalizations
based on observation of economic effects: that, for example, price-fixing is
illegal per se because many instances of the practice have shown over the years
that it always (or nearly always) does economic harm. But this is a mistaken
view. (No doubt antitrust reflects inter alia a general consensus in the United
States that price-fixing and other restrictive practices are, on balance,
economically harmful: but the legal rule that price-fixing is illegal per se
would be in no way upset by the occurrence of cases in which fixed prices
could be shown to be beneficial.) What is clear and unmistakable is a per se
offence is not its economic effect but its restrictive intent.
102. Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9
U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 111, 153.
103. A-'Fy. GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 340 (1955). In Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the Court said:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question, the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse;
but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
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provisions may be to promote legitimate business interests, a rule of per
se illegality applied to such provisions based solely upon analogies to
resale price maintenance and horizontal market division would be in-
appropriate.
Another argument against territorial security is based upon a
statement in United States v. Bausch & Lomb.. to the effect that once
a seller of trademarked goods has parted with title to goods, he may not
lawfully restrict the purchaser's freedom to sell the purchased items
wherever and to whomever he pleases, regardless of the reasons for the
restriction or its economic effect."' This argument ignores the fact that a
trademark creates a special nexus between a trademark owner and his
dealers, arising from the interests of both in creating, maintaining and
increasing consumer demand for the trademarked goods.' Passage
of title to a trademarked commodity does not end all relationship of
the trademark owner to the commodity, at least while it remains in
commercial channels." 7 It may be vital to his interests that the functions
of distribution be in the hands of persons who are subject to certain
controls by him.' If those controls are designed to promote some
legitimate business interest, they should be prohibited only if some
restraint of competition in the market as a whole is clearly discernible.0"
It would not be desirable to invalidate territorial security merely
because it restricts the freedom of the dealer to sell wherever and to
whomever he pleases. The restriction arises from a contract by the dealer,
and any contract limits to some extent the freedom of the contracting
104. 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944) :
A distributor of a trade-marked article may not lawfully limit by agreement,
express or implied, the price at which or the persons to whom its purchaser
may resell except as the seller moves along the route which is marked by the
Miller-Tydings Act.... Even the additional protection of a copyright, . . . or
of a patent, . . . add nothing to a distributor's power to control prices of resale
by a purchaser. The same thing is true as to restriction of cusomers ...
This broad statement should be evaluated in the light of the context in which it
was made. This case involved restrictions on resale as a part of an elaborate resale
price maintenance scheme. Price fixing was such "an integral part of the whole
distribution system" as to render the entire scheme illegal. 321 U.S. at 720. Even in the
statement relied upon by the Government, the Court seems to have treated the scheme
as a whole. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Shernar Act, 75
HzAv. L. REv. 795, 799-800.
The cases cited by the Court in support of its statement regarding the invalidity
of customer restrictions all involved horizontal agreements between suppliers to dis-
criminate against certain classes of customers. Jordan, supra note 102, at 148.
105. Id. at 153.
106. CALLtAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, § 15.5 (Supp. 1963).
107. Ibid.
108. Jordan, supra note 102, at 154.
109. Ibid.
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parties."' Moreover, the restriction may have been adopted in order
to protect the dealer,"' and it may have been the dealer himself who
requested the restriction as his price for making substantial investment
in a dealership." 2 The legality of territorial security, rather, ought to be
evaluated under the rule of reason. The reasonableness of such arrange-
ments should be appraised according to the factors suggested in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co."' and reiterated in Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States:"4 "[1] the percentage of business con-
trolled, [2] the strength of the remaining competition, [and, 3] whether
the action springs from business requirements or purpose to monop-
olize.""' Admittedly, a rule-of-reason approach to territorial security
might have certain disadvantages. It would not provide the certainty of
a per se rule of illegality, it could lead to long and expensive trials, and it
might hinder enforcement of the antitrust laws."' A rule-of-reason ap-
proach might also make inroads on existing per se rules of illegality. For
example, if a small supplier were allowed to territorially confine his
dealers, it might be argued that he should likewise be allowed to practice
resale price maintenance." 7 On the other hand, a rule of per se illegality
applied to territorial security would ban one effective method of com-
peting without making lawful alternatives equally available to all sup-
pliers."' If a per se rule is applied, relatively strong suppliers might
still be able to territorially confine their dealers under a patent or trade-
mark license agreement, or take over the functions of distribution by
110. Id. at 153-54.
111. PASHIGIAN, THE DISRIBUTIONT OF AUTOMOBILES, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM 39 (Ford Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Series, 1960 Award
Winner, 1961).
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